The Homer of the Pacific:  Melville\u27s Art and the Ambiguities of Judging Evil by Bollinger, Lee C.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 75 
Issue 5 Issues 5&6 
1977 
The Homer of the Pacific: Melville's Art and the Ambiguities of 
Judging Evil 
Lee C. Bollinger 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Legal 
Biography Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee C. Bollinger, The Homer of the Pacific: Melville's Art and the Ambiguities of Judging Evil, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 823 (1977). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol75/iss5/4 
 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE HOMER OF THE PACIFIC: 
MELVILLE'S ART AND THE 
AMBIGUITIES OF JUDGING EVIL 
Lee C. Bollinger* 
And there arose among them the heroic son of Atreus, Agamemnon 
whose sway was wide. He was angry; his black heart was filled with 
a great rage, and his eyes were like a blazing fire. First he spoke 
to Calchas, and gave him a malignant look: "Seer of evil; never yet 
have you told me anything f avourful. You delight, always, in 
prophesying evil; never have you either said or done anything good."t 
Writing in 1952 of Herman Melville's work and its significance, 
Albert Camus praised Melville as the "Homer of the Pacific."1 Such 
Olympian fame was deserved, Camus wrote, because "[i]f it is true 
that talent recreates life, while genius has the additional gift of 
crowning it with myths, Melville is first and foremost a creator of 
myths."2 This essay concerns one aspect of those myths, Melville's 
exploration of man's struggle with the injustice and evil that origi-
nates from both within and without himself, and asserts its relevance 
to an understanding of the judicial process. 
It should not be surprising that Herman. Melville has an impor-
tant message for students of the legal system, when one reflects for 
a moment on his biography and the subject matter of his writings. 
Melville had an intimate exposure to various legal systems ranging 
from the very crude to the more sophisticated, due in part at least 
to close personal ties with people who. were themselves connected 
with the law in one way or another. When Melville was thirteen 
years old his father declared himself bankrupt, then went mad 
and died. Melville's cousin had presided over a widely publicized 
and criticized court-martial aboard a naval vessel in 1842, in which 
three sailors, one of whom was the son of the Secretary of War, John 
C. Spenser, were convicted and hanged for mutiny. Melville's older 
brother, Gansevoort, had studied law, and .his next younger brother, 
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.S. 1968, University 
of Oregon; J.D. 1971, Columbia University.-Ed. 
t HoMER, THE ILLIAD, Book I. 
1. Article published in Les Ecrivains celebres, Editions Mazenod, Vol. III, 1952, 
reprinted in A. CAMUS, LYRICAL AND CRITICAL EsSAYS, 288, 291 (Vintage ed. 1968). 
2. Id. at 290. 
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Allan, practiced law on Wall Street. For several years, in fact, 
brothers Herman and Allan and their respective families shared a 
home in New York City, during which time Melville transformed and 
refined his artistic skills with the writing of Mardi, Redburn, and 
White Jacket.3 Finally, the author had close personal ties with Lem-
uel Shaw, at that time the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court, who was a close friend of Melville's father, 
a source of comfort and guidance for the Melville family after the 
father's death, and a generous and attentive father-in-law to Mel-
ville. Judge Shaw's presence and influence should not be underesti-
mated; in 1852 he even arranged for Melville to vacation with him 
in Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard when, after the poor reception 
that greeted the publication of Moby Dick and Pierre, Or the Ambi-
guities, Melville's family decided that the struggling writer might be 
revitalized by some new contacts with seaports and their inhabitants. 
Melville's familiarity with the operations of law, however, was 
based on considerably more than a mere acquaintance with its func-
tionaries. Of undeniable significance were Melville's years spent as 
a sailor and seaman aboard a merchant vessel, several whaling ships, 
and a United States man-o'-war. Within these microcosms Melville 
was a close witness to the workings of a discrete, albeit unique, 
legal system in a way that few people ever are. The impact of 
these experiences is hard to grasp in the abstract, but a brief illus-
tration perhaps will help make the point. From August 30, 1843, 
to October 3, 1844, Melville sailed as a common seaman from Hono-
lulu Bay to Boston aboard the naval frigate United States. At that 
time it was the practice to call all sailors to the deck to witness two 
extraordinary events. One was the complete reading, every month, 
of the Articles of War, which detailed the various transgressions for 
which a sailor could be punished, and which usually ended with the 
ominous refrain, "shall suffer death." The other was to observe the 
punishment, by flogging, of fellow seamen for infractions of these 
rules, which varied in magnitude from swearing to thievery, and gen-
erally involved twelve lashes with a cat-o'-nine-tails. During his 
fourteen months aboard the United States Melville witnessed the 
flogging of some 163 seamen. 4 Both of these spectacles, but par-
ticularly that of flogging, were later movingly portrayed in Melville's 
book White Jacket. 
3. Melville's close relationship with his younger brother, together with his ulti-
mate lack of popular success as an author, are two pieces of data which, if kept 
in mind when reading Bartleby, the Scrivener, make that oddly amusing story about 
a Wall Street lawyer and his clerk so very poignant. 
4. See C. ANDERSON, MELVILLE JN THE Sourn SEAS 425 (Dover ed. 1966). 
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My immediate point is that for Melville the "law" was not an ab-
straction, but rather just the opposite. It was part of his life at sea 
to know the rules, frequently to witness the events that resulted in 
punishment, to hear the charges and the responses, to observe the 
inflictions of punishment, and to know the people involved-to see 
their faces, hear their voices, and observe their actions. Law must 
have had an immediacy, an intensity of involvement for everyone 
aboard ship. In this respect life at sea must have borne some resem-
blance to life in the classical Greek polis. Perhaps the contemporary 
analogue would be to imagine the impact on our society had the 
American public been required to watch on television the trial, con-
viction, and execution of Gary Gilmore. 
Melville's ultimate importance for the legal scholar, however, lies 
not in his explicit commentary on problems peculiar to the legal sys-
tem. Apart from Billy Budd, one of the classics of that small diadem 
of "legal literature," Melville's works only infrequently make explicit 
symbolic use of legal personages or the judicial process. For Mel-
ville the dilemmas of judging were but illustrations of more general 
concerns about human activity. Like Homer, Melville is primarily 
concerned with man's attempt to act within the imperfect world he 
inherits. Although one writer speaks of the role of gods, and the 
other hints of the role of the unconscious, both were fascinated by 
the complex interaction of mixed human motives and fateful, exter-
nal circumstances. Hector, for all his glory, fights and dies on behalf 
of a cause he knows is unjust. 5 Thus, Melville's art, like Homer's, 
knows no intellectual boundaries. It speaks a universal language 
comprehensible to all "disciplines," and it has a rightful claim to the 
attention of all interested in understanding human behavior. Like 
Calchas, the prophet who tells the assembled Achaians how Aga-
memnon has offended the gods and brought devastation upon them, 
Melville boldly speaks of the evil and injustice in the world and of 
our complicity, although not always, to be sure, to a grateful audience. 
I. 
The theme of man's struggle with injustice and evil is a continu-
ous thread running throughout Melville's works. Instead of develop-
ing this idea through a comprehensive survey of Melville's novels and 
short stories, however, I have chosen to focus on a single work, Ben-
ito Cereno, a tale based on events recounted in an obscure book that 
5. This point is made most forcefully in Shakespeare's play Troilus and Cressida, 
act 2, scene 2. 
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Melville chanced to find, entitled A Narrative of Voyages and Travels 
in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, by Captain Amasa 
Delano. By concentrating solely on this story, my hope is to sharpen 
the focus, to avoid being discursive and too abstract, and to aid the 
reader generally unfamiliar with Melville's works. 
A. 
Benito Cereno begins on a calm, gray day in 1799. The sea is 
"sleeked at the surface like waved lead that has cooled and set in 
the smelter's mould" and the sky seems "a gray surtout." An Amer-
ican cargo ship, replenishing its water supply, is anchored in the bay 
of a small deserted island off the coast of Chile. Near dawn, the 
captain, Amasa Delano, is advised of the appearance in the bay of 
a strange ship. The "lawlessness and loneliness of the spot," to-
gether with various odd particulars relating to the appearance and 
movement of the stranger, fairly justify some apprehension. But 
Delano is of an unsuspecting nature, and he promptly decides to visit 
the incoming ship in his whaleboat, so that in the event she is in 
distress he might help "pilot her in." As the whaleboat is launched 
Delano first envisions the stranger as some "white-washed monastery 
after a thunder-storm, seen perched upon some dun cliff among the 
Pyrenees. Peering over the bulwarks were what really seemed, in 
the hazy distance, throngs of dark cowls, while, fitfully revealed 
through the open portholes, other dark figures were dimly described, 
as of Black Friars pacing the cloisters." As the whaleboat draws 
nearer, the ship reveals itself not as a monastery, but as a Spanish 
merchantman, named the San Dominick, carrying a cargo of slaves. 
Once a stately, aristocratic ship, the San Dominick is now in a state 
of considerable disrepair. Observing the ship's features, Delano 
notes that the figurehead at the front of the ship is wrapped in canvas; 
beneath this is chalked the sentence "follow your leader." 
Boarding the San Dominick, Delano is accosted by a noisy mob 
of African blacks and Spanish whites, from whom he quickly learns 
that the ship has been severely depopulated by scurvy and fever. 
After being nearly wrecked while navigating the waters around Cape 
Horn, the ship was becalmed, and its supplies quickly became de-
pleted. The Spaniards had been more seriously thinned by these 
events than the slaves, and without provisions or officers the vessel 
had drifted to its present location. Discipline within the San Domi-
nick seems to have given way to the necessities of bad fortune. The 
slaves move about unimpeded, and the few remaining Spaniards ap-
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pear to be either disinclined or unable to maintain any semblance 
of order. In every respect the San Dominick reflects disarray and 
decay. 
The captain of the San Dominick, Don Benito Cereno, is a slight 
man, about thirty years old, in obviously poor health. Dressed in 
his most decorous aristocratic uniform, Don Benito is like a once 
great but now ineffectual potentate clinging to the appearance of au-
thority, and his ornate presence contrasts sharply with the surround-
ing squalor of his subjects. He is at odds moody, laconic, discourte-
ous, absent-minded, and given to curious fits of severe indisposition 
and depression. When Delano questions him for more details about 
the ship's misfortunes, Don Benito silently stares first at Delano and 
then at the deck; uncomfortable in the face of this behavior, Delano 
turns around to leave, only then to be recalled to have Don Benito 
reluctantly recount the history of the San Dominick. As he describes 
the gales encountered near the Cape and the loss of life that re-
sulted, Don Benito suddenly collapses into the arms of his servant. 
Recovering, Don Benito expresses his gratitude to "those negroes 
you see, who, though to your inexperienced eyes appearing unruly, 
have, indeed, conducted themselves with less restlessness than even 
their owner could have thought possible under such circumstances." 
Again he grows faint. 
The owner of the slaves was Don Benito's friend from youth, 
Don Alexandro Aranda, said to have been a victim of the fever. 
Don Benito is obviously greatly distraught at the loss of his friend, 
and Delano seeks to comfort him by expressing what he believes 
"gives the keener edge to [Don Benito's] grief." To bury a friend 
at sea, to dispose of his remains "like scraps to the dogs," remarks 
Captain Delano, is unbearable. Delano suggests to Don Benito: 
"Were your friend's remains now on board this ship . . . not thus 
strangely would the mention of his name affect you." Seemingly 
horrified at this thought, Don Benito faints anew, and Delano won-
ders at the differences between men, and how what is comfort to 
one is but fuel to another's superstitious nature. 
The servant who so devotedly attends Don Benito is a small black 
slave named Babo. Captain Delano is deeply impressed with the 
attention Babo lavishes on Don Benito and speaks openly of the re-
markable relationship existing between a master and servant, al-
though the friendship he has in mind is similar to that between a 
man and his dog. 
After seeing the condition of the San Dominick and the state of 
its inhabitants,. Captain Delano dispatches his whaleboat with orders 
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to return with food and drink. He remains aboard the San Dominick 
to await a rising wind that will permit him to bring her to anchor 
within the bay, where she can then be readied for the remainder of 
her voyage. The day continues motionless, however, and the San 
Dominick drifts slowly out to sea with the receding tide. 
It is during this long interval that Captain Delano senses that the 
San Dominick is shrouded in some ineffable mystery. Various 
events unsettle Delano. At one point, while Don Benito and Delano 
are conversing, Don Benito takes Babo aside for a whispered confer-
ence, the subject of which seems to be Captain Delano. This ill be-
havior is compounded when Don Benito momentarily returns to ask 
Delano about such matters as the number of men aboard the Ameri-
can ship, their expected whereabouts for that evening, and details 
about the ship's cargo. Delano speculates as to whether he is con-
fronted by either "innocent lunacy, or wicked imposture." Don 
Benito also appears at times both vicious and arrogant. After Babo 
nicks his master while shaving him, Captain Delano sees Babo with 
his cheek slashed, apparently the consequence of Don Benito's 
pique. Another scene reveals that Don Benito has a regal-looking 
slave named Atufal, reputed to have been a king in Africa, kept in 
chains, and brought before him every two hours to ask Don Benito's 
pardon for an offense long forgotten and of apparently trivial pro-
portions. 
Other events heighten the threatening atmosphere. A group of 
Ashantee slaves sit polishing rusted hatchets, while four elder slaves 
discreetly positioned on the deck sit silently picking "junk into 
oakum." When a Spanish boy is knifed by a slave boy, and a Span-
ish sailor is accosted by two slaves, no sanctions are imposed for 
these obvious transgressions of ordinary discipline. Several Spanish 
sailors seem intent on giving Delano meaningful looks, although to 
Captain Delano they remain enigmatic. 
These circumstances at times cause Delano to be concerned for 
his own safety. But his fundamentally positive outlook on the world 
leads him to dismiss malign explanations and embrace innocent ones 
instead, upbraiding himself for succumbing to childish fears. Thus, 
Don Benito's haughty airs and inhospitality are easily attributed to 
his ill health, and to the loss of his friend Aranda and his sailors; 
the polishing of hatchets by the slaves is justified as a policy of keep-
ing the slaves occupied; and so on. Visions of evil, therefore, shift 
into visions of innocence' and back again. 
Finally, in the late afternoon a breeze freshens and Delano is 
able to work the ship back into the bay. The whaleboat arrives to 
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return Delano to his ship for the night, and Don Benito follows him 
to the deck, being for once profusely thankful. As Delano enters 
the whaleboat and is about to depart, Don Benito suddenly leaps 
overboard into the boat. At first, Delano believes his worst fears 
about Don Benito are confirmed: Don Benito is acting to arouse the 
slaves by suggesting that he is being kidnapped. But when Babo 
follows Don Benito into the boat and then attacks him with a knife, 
Captain Delano grasps the significance of the preceding events. 
"With scales dropped from his eyes," Captain Delano sees "the ne-
groes, not in misrule, not in tumult, not as if frantically concerned 
for Don Benito, but with mask tom away, flourishing hatchets and 
knives, in ferocious piratical revolt." In the ensuing fray, the canvas 
about the ship's bow is torn away, revealing a human skeleton as the 
ship's ghastly figurehead, over the inscription "follow your leader." 
Don Benito knows, and exclaims, that it is the 'skeleton of his friend, 
Aranda. In quick succession the story relates that the revolt was 
crushed, the San Dominick was retaken, and the ships then sailed 
to Lima, Peru. There a criminal prosecution was initiated against 
Babo and the slaves. 
To reconstruct the events that had occurred aboard the San Dom-
inick both before and after the arrival of Captain Delano, Melville 
sets forth, almost verbatim, Don Benito's deposition for the vice-re-
gal courts in Lima. As legal prose sometimes does, the raw, prosaic 
recounting of events only intensifies the horror: Don Benito testifies, 
inter alia, that the San Dominick had sailed from Valparaiso for 
Callao with 160 slaves, property of Don Alexandro Aranda, along 
with thirty-six crew members and some passengers; that one week 
out of port the slaves had revolted, killing eighteen men and taking 
control of the ship; that by threatening to kill all remaining whites, 
Babo, the leader of the slaves, had obtained Don Benito's promise 
to navigate the ship to Senegal, after first visiting the island of Santa 
Maria to obtain the water necessary for the journey; that en route 
thereto, Babo had declared _his intention to murder Don Alexandro 
Aranda, in order to insure the freedom of the· blacks and to set an 
example for the other whites; that he requested Don Benito to order 
away Aranda's cabinmate, a good navigator, so that he would not also 
be killed; that despite Don Benito's pleadings that his friend's life 
be spared, he succumbed in the end and called away the cabinmate; 
that Aranda was then murdered; that Babo afterward ordered ten 
other Spaniards thrown into the sea, where they perished; that even-
tually the slaves murdered Aranda's cabinmate, the navigator; that 
several days after Aranda's murder, Babo took each Spaniard sepa-
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rately to the ship's prow, where a skeleton had been positioned as 
the figurehead, and asked each "whose skeleton that was, and 
whether, from its whiteness, he should not think it a white's; that 
upon discovering his face, the negro Babo, coming close, said words 
to this effect: 'Keep faith with the blacks from here to Senegal, or 
you shall in spirit as now in body, follow your leader .. .' "; that 
upon arriving at the island of Santa Maria and encountering the 
American ship, Babo announced the scheme of pretending that Don 
Benito was still in control of the ship and that the conditions of the 
ship were due to fever and weather; that while Captain Delano was 
on board the San Dominick, Babo decided on a plan to capture the 
American ship that night; and that, of course, the entire revolt and 
scheme were frustrated by ,the intervention of Captain Delano and the 
Americans. 
The deposition concludes with some details concerning the 
American recapture of the San Dominick. Apparently, the Ameri-
cans killed one Spaniard when they misinterpreted his plea that they 
not board the ship. The Americans thought this evidence of the 
Spaniard's alignment with the slaves, whereas in fact the Spaniard 
feared that an attempt to recapture the ship would provoke the 
blacks into killing all remaining whites. Another Spaniard, his 
hands having been covered with tar by the slaves and a hatchet arti-
ficially secured in his upraised arm, was also shot by the Americans, 
mistaken for "a renegade seaman.'' Finally, after the revolt had 
been crushed and the ship anchored, some sailors had continued to 
kill slaves who were "shackled to the ring bolts on deck." 
Melville then returns to the narrative and describes briefly the 
substance of the conversations between Don Benito and Captain De-
lano on the voyage from Santa Maria to Lima. Don Benito repeats 
"[a]gain and again . . . how hard it had been to enact the part 
forced on the Spaniard by Babo.'' After Don Benito and Captain 
Delano each graciously acknowledge that the other saved his life, 
Captain Delano remarks about how trusting he had been that day on 
board the San Dominick, and how "[o]nly at the end did [his] sus-
picions get the better of [him], and you know how wide of the mark 
they then proved." To this Don Benito responds: 
Wide, indeed . . . you were with me all day; stood with me, sat 
with me, talked with me, looked at me, ate with me, drank with 
me; and yet, your last act was to clutch for a monster, not only an 
innocent man, but the most pitiable of all men. To such degree 
may malign machinations and deceptions impose. So far may 
even the best man err, in judging the conduct of one with the re-
cesses of whose condition he is not acquainted. But you were forced 
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to it; and you were in time undeceived. Would that, in both respects, 
it was so ever, and with all men. 
But Don Benito is profoundly unstrung by these events. Despite 
Captain Delano's urgings that he forget the past, to quit "moralizing" 
about it, it is clear that some wound within Don Benito has been 
opened ·and festers unhealed. "You are saved," Captain Delano ex-
claims, "what has cast such a shadow upon you?" Don Benito 
responds only: "The negro." 
Don Benito is never able to look at Babo again. At the trial, 
when the judges order him to identify Babo, Don Benito faints. 
Babo is convicted, hanged, and his body burned. The head, "that 
hive of subtlety," is positioned atop a stake in the plaza. "Unabash-
edly" it looks at the whites, at a church in the plaza, within which 
rest the bones of Don Alexander Aranda, and then finally at a 
monastery on a distant mountain, where ",three months after being 
dismissed by the court, Benito Cereno, borne on the bier, did, 
indeed, follow his leader." 
B. 
The tale of Benito Cereno is a highly evocative story of broad 
intellectual dimensions. Melville's fascination with Delano's story is 
readily explainable, as it is richly suggestive in themes that Melville 
found absorbing. One senses, for example, the contrast between the 
decadence of the Old World, with its hollow aristocrats splendidly 
raimented to hide their fecklessness, and the New World, with its fresh, 
open, energetic common me:ri. But this and other such themes are 
subsidiary to the much more awesome subject of evil within man and 
the world. 
At its heart the story is about the omnipresence of evil and in-
justice. In our blemished world good and evil are inextricably linked 
in everything, with evil always ready to push forth and dominate at 
the first opportunity. When Delano has occasion to witness on the 
San Dominick a youthful black woman nursing her infant child, he 
remarks to himself: "There's naked nature, now; pure tenderness 
and love .... " The naivete of this thought is later apparent when 
it is revealed that the black women had urged the black males to 
torture, not simply murder, Aranda, and that while other murders 
were being committed, they had sung melancholy songs to heighten 
the atmosphere of murderous frenzy. We also discern this inter-
mingling of innocence and evil in the circumstances surrounding the 
slaves' revolt and the American recovery of the San Dominick from 
the slaves. Both incidents illustrate how close to the surface lies the 
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evil within man and how innocence blends almost unnoticeably into 
evil, like shades of colors, for both the slaves and the American sea-
men commit excesses of violence in pursuing their initially just goals. 
Violence, once loosed, even in the cause of righteousness, is not 
easily confined to its original purpose. To Melville we are given 
both a flawed world and imperfect souls. All attempts to make 
either the world or ourselves otherwise are doomed to failure. Merely 
to act is to make oneself the instrument of a fateful injustice within the 
world. Thus, in seeking the capture of the slaves, the American 
sailors innocently, but nonetheless effectively, kill two Spaniards. 
Benito Cereno is, however, also a statement about appearances 
and reality, about the difficulties of getting a grip on the world 
around us. The very structure of Benito Cereno is built around con-
tinually shifting perceptions. What first seems from a distance to 
be a monastery becomes on closer inspection a slave ship, which, 
then again, is not exactly a correct perception. The irony of this 
juxtaposition of religious peace and innocence, itself an illusion that 
Melville unmasks in other novels, and brutal slavery sets the tone 
for what then becomes a kaleidoscope of vacillating visions. Inno-
cence 'and evil can each be disguised as the other. What seems 
devotedness in the servant is really the manipulation of a sinister 
puppeteer; and what seems the conniving, brutish conduct in Don 
Benito is really the behavior of a marionette. The crowning ambiguity 
comes when Melville hints, ever so slightly, just after presenting the 
deposition, that it too may be wrong; the full truth may be ultimately 
unknown and unascertainable. 6 
But difficult as it is to penetrate the illusions of the outer world, 
so much more so is it to probe the depths of our own hearts. For 
Don Benito is destroyed not by the acts of others, or by his failure 
to perceive accurately the reality of the outer world, but by a vision, 
however unconscious, into his own soul. There is sad irony in Don 
Benito's lament, when "moralizing" to Captain Delano about the pre-
ceding events, that all the time he was "not only an innocent man, 
but the most pitiable of all men." He would have the world believe 
that he is a victimized and misunderstood man. But although he 
physically refuses to look again upon Babo, the smiling face remains 
with him, and its mocking gaze rips through the veil of pretended 
innocence. For Don Benito's complicity in the unfolding events of 
evil is as deep as any. As captain of a slave ship he is hardly "inno-
6. Melville says cautiously, "If the Deposition has served as the key to fit into 
the lock of the complications which precede it, then, as a vault whose door has 
been flung back, the San Dominick's hull lies open today." 
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cent," although in some sense he is surely "pitiable." He was 
throughout the instrument of evil, first for his friend Aranda, .and 
then later for Babo. Don Benito's efforts at self-delusion cannot 
overcome the gnawing agony of his inner knowledge. 
As Captain Delano first nears the San Dominick in his whale-
boat, he sees a carved crest on the stern. It is "intricately carved 
with the arms of Castile and Leon, medallioned about by groups of 
mythological or symbolic devices; uppermost and central of which 
was a dark satyr in a mask, holding his foot on the prostrate neck 
of a writhing figure, likewise masked." This, indeed, is a fitting 
symbol for the drama that follows. The satyr seeks to hide from 
others his own identity and from himself the identity of his evil deeds. 
Self-delusion and posturing are the inevitable hallmarks of an imper-
fect world gripped by evil. 
II. 
In shifting our thinking from a symbolic work of art like Benito 
Cereno to the workings of the legal system, we inevitably experience 
a slight weakness in the legs. An intellectual jet lag sets in, as if 
we have arrived at a distant world characterized by different con-
cerns and by an almost wholly separate style of thought and mode 
of discourse. At first this difficulty in transition might be attributed 
to a belief that whereas literature is contrived, abstract, and ethereal, 
legal thinking, in contrast, is more concrete and concerned with the 
ordinary lives of people, thereby greatly magnifying existing analyti-
cal complexities. In an important sense, however, the situation is 
just the reverse: it is we participants in the legal system who think 
systematically about justice and who tend toward abstraction, with 
our principles, concepts, and theoretical structures; whereas an 
author like Melville is ultimately concerned with unraveling life 
itself, particularly the tangled skein of mixed purposes and fateful 
circumstances that underlie all human activity. Coming from the 
sunny heights of jurisprudential abstraction, it is difficult for the 
lawyer, judge, or legal scholar to descend into the muddy, dimly lit 
world behind the masks we all wear and put on others. 7 
Pursuing the belief, therefore, that an author like Melville can 
help us identify and pierce the myths, illusions, and hypocrisy that 
7. For an attempt to assert and analyze the tendency of judges, and legal scholars, 
to treat litigants as "entities" rather than "persons," to "[suppress] the humanity of 
a participant in the [legal] process" (p. 20), see Professor John T. Noonan's recent 
book, Persons & Masks of the Law. Professor Noonan does not address the origins 
of the tendency he identifies. He also purports to deal with what he believes is a 
universal phenomenon and does not speak to the problems that arise from judicial 
complicity in injustice. 
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may surround us, the remainder of this essay will attempt to offer 
a richer appreciation of the complexity of the task of judging. The 
first of the two sections that follow briefly sets forth a thesis about 
the judicial involvement with injustice. The second section is a re-
finement and elaboration of that thesis through an examination of 
some contemporary legal scholarship. 
A. 
Those of us who are directly concerned with administering and 
understanding the legal process work and think within a more or less 
accepted mental framework, one that helps us to interpret the 
phenomena of our experience and that defines the relevant problems 
that ought to command our attention. One of the central hallmarks 
of our legal tradition is its fundamentally reformist outlook. The 
orientation of our thinking about legal decisionmaking is, generally 
speaking, concerned with the business of achieving justice. The 
scope of our inquiries is usually bounded by the questions what is 
justice? and how can it be achieved? Injustice within the system 
is recognized, but only with the reformer's optimistic eye, focusing 
on the identification and correction of problems. The triumph of 
justice, though perhaps distant, is nonetheless thought to be per-
ceived. This is, I believe, largely as it should and must be. But 
in all this striving for justice, we resemble a man walking with his 
backside into a storm. Under the: circumstances, it is useful occa-
sionally to turn around and assess the full force of our condition. 
When we do, we find that in fact a major ineradicable conse-
quence of the judging process is the accomplishment of injustice. 
That this is the case should not be surprising upon a brief reflection. 
Given the imperfection of the people who define and administer the 
structure of justice, injustice is inevitable. Indeed, our ideas about 
such concepts as a written constitution, the adversarial system, and 
appellate review are premised on the assumption of imperfection. 
The yearly flurry of cases correcting what are thought to be clear 
injustices only further demonstrates our continued inability to 
achieve success. No one, of course, believes that each year's deci-
sions push us into the black on the ledger of justice. Even those 
injustices that are rectified have typically existed for many years, per-
haps decades, and most were recognized even then as being unjust. 
The reality would seem to be that we are engaged in a continual 
struggle against injustice, one without hope of a successful conclu-
sion. New laws are enacted and precedents created that leave a 
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wake of injustice before they are repealed or overturned. In the 
interim judges enforce these laws. Judicial complicity, however, 
goes well beyond that. Like all of us, judges are prone to accidents 
and mistakes, although theirs may lead innocent people to languish 
in prison, or even now to suffer death. But, even more important, 
it must be recognized that judges sometimes knowingly and deliber-
ately employ their power in unjust ways, or in ways that contribute 
to injustice; they do so not simply for malicious or sinister reasons, 
but because they lack the will to extricate themselves from particular 
circumstances, because they refuse to confront certain aspects of 
their personalities, because of boredom, and because of a host of 
complex reasons that determine individual action. This is the rule 
and not the exception, and we could not expect it to be otherwise. 
For the judge this existential reality has a special poignancy 
that is the result of two factors inherent in the judicial office. The 
first is the fact that to judge others it is necessary in some way to 
judge oneself, a process that, not surprisingly, creates some uneasi-
ness. Learned Hand is said to have remarked of the sentencing of 
criminal defendants: "Here I am an old man in a long nightgown 
making muffled noises at people who may be no worse than I am."8 
The anguish underlying Hand's statement is apparent and accounts 
for its power. To be sure, the process is not always conscious, for 
otherwise Hand's remark would not be so memorable; nor does it 
necessarily lead to just decisions. In fact, the opposite can occur, as, 
for example, when the judge, like Don Benito attempting to face 
Babo at trial, is rendered incapacitated in the face of evil. The sym-
bolic functions of the institution comprise a second reason why judi-
cial complicity bears a special edge. In our society the judge is the 
very paradigm of rectitude; he is the first person in our "system of 
justice." Yet his shortcomings in that regard must continuously re-
mind him of the ultimate contradiction between the world as it is 
and as we idealize it. 
Considering all of this, we should expect to discern within the 
judicial process a style of thought and expression that seeks to deny 
the force of this painful reality. In the interplay between the judge's 
personal and official imperfections and his identification with the ful-
fillment of justice, judges could be expected to more or less pretend 
to live according to the image and not the full reality. As a result, 
their decisionmaking is characterized by the desire to avoid a recog-
nition of complicity. Its elements are complex, but it may manifest 
8. Quoted in M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 16 
(1973 ). 
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itself in a certain self-righteousness, or in a tendency toward abstrac-
tion in reasoning, passionless ratiocination, offered to show the inex-
orability of the result. We are familiar with this posturing and usu-
ally attribute it to a judicial concern to avoid appearing to have 
utilized personal value preferences in choosing one result over other 
possibilities. But that can be only a guise; the concern over com-
plicity cuts much deeper. 
The difficulty with pretense is that it may lead to a kind of moral 
blindness. The posture we have assumed becomes more important 
to us than the reality of what we are doing. If that is so with the 
judge, then he is surely the quintessence of the person caught in an 
imperfect world. Within that world he becomes both the victim and 
the perpetrator of injustice, reflecting in this way the tragedy of Don 
Benito. 
B. 
There is much in contemporary legal literature that pertains to 
the preceding observations on the inevitability and pervasiveness of 
injustice and the consequent posturing. Frequently, however, 
authors fail to appreciate the full dimensions of the problem of sys-
temic evil. Writers approach the dilemma but then pull back, leav-
ing important questions unasked and unresolved. 
In the remainder of this essay I shall discuss three recent works 
of legal scholarship that I believe best provide a context in which 
to illustrate and clarify the thesis presented earlier. The first two 
books-one entitled Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Ca-
price and Mistake, by Professor Charles Black, and the other 
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, by Judge Marvin Frankel 
-help to point out the enormity of the problem of injustice as well 
as to suggest some of its origins and the reasons for its pervasiveness. 
Both books, however, fall squarely within the reformist legal tradition 
of thinking that I identified earlier. What I draw from these books 
is secondary to their explicit agendas. The final book discussed 
here, Justice Accused: Antz'slavery and the Judicial Process, by Pro-
fessor Robert Cover, is different in this regard. Its purpose is to 
deal directly with the effect on judges of dispensing injustice through 
the administration of unjust laws, rather than to focus on injustice 
as a predicate for reform. Although its subject is historical, its in-
tended objective is to address a timeless and universal judicial conun-
drum. As such it is a significant aid to understanding the problem 
considered here. But helpful though it is, its in-depth treatment 
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necessarily narrows its focus, and, as I shall argue, it is ambiguous 
on critical questions relating to the problem of judicial complicity in 
evil. 
In 197 4 Professor Charles Black published a book detailing the 
serious problems that inhere in the administration of capital punish-
ment laws. Of the most immediate interest here, however, is not 
so much the author's discussion of capital punishment, but rather his 
sober and disturbing assessment of the criminal justice system in gen-
eral. In developing his powerful argument about capital punish-
ment, Professor Black forces us to begin to examine closely the im-
perfections of the legal process. 
Professor Black's thesis is that capital punishment is intolerable 
in any humanly conceived and administered system of justice be-
cause both mistake and irrational and arbitrary results are inevitable 
components. He explores this thesis by examining the various 
stages of a criminal prosecution: the prosecutor's decisions as to the 
appropriate criminal charge and the matters relating to plea bargain-
ing, the jury's decisions on guilt and innocence, the issue of deserved 
punishment, the appellate review of questions of law, and finally, 
the clemency process. Each step is shown to be ripe for the 
possibility of mistake where rules exist, or for caprice and arbitrari-
ness where only vague and uncertain standards apply, which of 
course is the more typical situation. Black's position is that we are 
not dealing here with a minor flaw in the system that is capable of 
remedy or is to be dismissed as of infrequent occurrence. Rather, 
he considers this the fundamental character of the criminal law. 
Perhaps nothing captures this better than his characterization of the 
insanity doctrine: 
Once again, let us remember that we have committed ourselves 
not to kill by law, or even to punish, anyone who satisfies certain 
criteria as to the connection of "insanity" with the commission of the 
act. Yet the astounding fact is that, having made this commitment, 
for what must be the most imperative moral reasons, we cannot 
state these criteria in any understandable form, in any form satisfying 
to the relevant specialists or comprehensible to either judge or jury, 
despite repeated and earnest trials. The upshot of the best writing on 
the subject is that we have so far failed in defining exculpatory 
"insanity," and that success is nowhere in sight. Yet we have to 
assume, unless the whole thing has been a solemn frolic, that we exe-
cute some people, and put others into medical custody, because we 
think that the ones we execute fall on one side of this line, and the 
others on the other side. 9 
9. C. BLACK, CAPITAL PuNISHMBNT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAP.RICE AND MIS· 
TAKE 52-53 (1974). 
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What Black says about the possibility of arbitrarily electing between 
execution and a declaration of insanity also applies, of course, when 
the choice is between incarceration and a declaration of insanity. 
Black recognizes this, but he does not make the extravagant argu-
ment that the entire criminal law system must be scrapped. Rather, 
he makes the more limited claim that punishment by death com-
pounds these incorrigible evils by its finality and is therefore distin-
guishable. 
Although no remedial consequences flow from his observations, 
the book is a powerful statement on the condition of criminal justice. 
What Black describes has a significance in itself, although his im-
mediate goal does not lead him to consider its implications. As a by-
product of his scholarship, we have a glimpse of the injustice arising 
from human limitations and a reminder of the American seamen mis-
takenly killing the Spaniards who appeared to be rebels aligned with 
the slaves. 
This perception of the stark reality of the criminal process is ex-
panded upon in Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, by Mar-
vin Frankel, a respected federal district judge for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. As a critique of the sentencing process, this book 
speaks with the peculiar force accorded an insider's view of official-
dom. But its principal value, its originality and power, derives from 
the intelligence and candor with which Frankel explores a process 
that he quite obviously finds a private horror, and he spares neither 
himself nor other judges as he describes the Kafkaesque process of 
incarceration. 
Frankel argues that the sentencing process suffers from a near-
total absence of law. Legislative guidelines are vague or virtually 
nonexistent; appellate review is precluded by doctrine that recognizes 
sentencing as a discretionary matter for ithe trial judge; no rule re-
quires the sentencing judge to publish a statement of reasons for his 
decision; public and scholarly attention are generally focused on other 
aspects of the criminal process, particularly those connected with the 
guilt-determining stage; and so on. Within this unbounded territory of 
power judges roam about fixing punishment. In such an environment 
it is hardly surprising that there flourish "monstrous evils perpetrated 
daily for all of us, and with our implicit or express acquiescence."10 
The evils arising from the system ·are generally familiar; there is, for 
example, the widely acknowledged injustice of grossly disparate sen-
tences, which even judges on the same court usually do little or nothing 
10. M. FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 124. 
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to minimize. But evil also exists within each courtroom. With tyranni-
cal power placed in his hands, "[c]onditioned in the direction of 
authoritarianism by his daily life in court, long habituated as a lawyer 
to the stance of the aggressive contestant,"11 some judges cannot re-
sist being tyrants. Instances of unconscionable use of sentencing 
power are familiar to everyone, of course, but Frankel provides us 
with a few shocking additions, one involving a judge who confided 
to Frankel and other judges at a cocktail party that, when a defend-
ant at the sentencing hearing strongly criticized the judge and the 
proceedings in which he had been convicted, he "simply gave the 
son of a bitch five years instead of the four" he. had originally 
decided upon.12 
What is so interesting about Frankel's book is that it does not 
purport to depict sentencing injustices as the product of aberrant be-
havior of a discrete set of judges. There is recognition, however 
subdued, that all judges more or less participate, trapped by their 
own imperfections and those of a system that seems to exist with 
a will of its own.13 As a footnote to the anecdote just noted, for 
example, Frankel writes, "[t]here is other evidence-including, I 
fear, some results of my own introspection-that the defendant's 
rare outbursts may carry a monstrous price."14 Such a confession 
by certainly one of our most conscientious judges ought to have a 
profound effect on us. 
The process is indeed grisly. As Frankel almost wincingly 
describes it, judges generally spend little time thinking about individ-
ual sentencing cases, with the predictable consequence that decisions 
frequently are arbitrary, reflect considerations by any standard inap-
propriate, and rest on assumptions, such as the availability of reha-
bilitation facilities, which the judge knows to be false. The upshot 
is that judges are committing people to prisons under conditions that 
are in many respects as evil as the offenses that are being punished. 
Much of the evil that Frankel describes is inevitable, although this 
is not his purpose. But like Professor Black, Frankel, perhaps un-
knowingly, transcends his professed purpose, for the reforms he 
11. Id. at 17. 
12. Id. at 18. 
13. Frankel says in his preface: 
The evils I mean to portray are grim. They have come to impress me as un-
bearable by any society that styles itself civilized. But they are not secret or 
mysterious. Nor are they assignable to any handy set of villains. While there 
is ample blame to share among the judges, lawyers, legislators, and all of us, 
the fundamental problem, as usual, is in the system, or lack of it. 
Id. at ix. 
14. Id. at 19. 
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ultimately proposes, however sensible and desirable, cannot alter the 
fundamental human nature that is at the root of the problem.10 
Thus, Frankel's book provides us with an even more disturbing 
statement of the reality of injustice in the legal system than Black's. 
In it we discern not just the unfortunate mistakes of good-minded 
people, but the traces of the more complex consequences of the pre-
carious inner balance of good and evil. With the focus on the 
criminal system more limited, we see more deeply into the plight 
of the ordinary judge. Whereas Black speaks of the American sea-
men accidentally killing Spaniards in the pursuit of justice, Frankel, 
speaks of the knowing complicity of Don Benito and of the forces 
of cruelty represented both in the black women during the slaves' 
revolt and in the final capturing and killing of the slaves by the 
American seamen. 
Frankel takes us further than Black into the problem of injustice 
in another respect as well. In seeking to bring some light to the 
darker regions of sentencing and prisons he discusses what he styles 
the "walls of silence."16 Nearly every person convicted of a crime 
encounters this wall: the refusal of judges, as well as prison offi-
cials and parole boards, to make any attempt whatsoever to explain 
their decisions. Banishment is accomplished with the aid of the im-
penetrable screen of silence. This is a form of posturing, of pre-
tense, as Frankel recognizes. The injustice produced by the system, 
or, more accurately, by those who make up the system, is masked by 
the facade of black robes (like Don Benito's aristocratic garments) 
and high benches and legal fictions, such as the idea that near-
absolute discretion over sentencing properly rests in the trial judge 
because he alone has the opportunity to "observe" the defendant. 17 
All of us are uncomfortable with the reality of these "dank subjects," 
preferring instead "lovely or exciting things."18 
Thus, Frankel's book advances our discussion in two important 
ways. It also, incidentally, provides us with some insight into the 
traits that we should wish for our judges. The book is remarkable 
15. The reforms Frankel proposes include legislative statements of the purposes 
of punishment, a requirement that the judge list and weigh the factors contributing 
to the sentencing decision, appellate review of sentences, and a commission on sen• 
tencing. See id. at 105-23. 
16. Id. at ch. 4. 
11. Id. at 82-83. 
18. Id. at ix. The same tendency to explain away evil as being simply "irra• 
tional behavior," or as involving only a few demented people, has been noted with 
respect to the infinitely more grotesque injustices perpetrated by twentieth century 
totalitarian governments. See H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALlTARtANtSM (1951); 
R, NISBET, Um QUEST FOR CoMMUNITY 194-96 (1953). 
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for its acknowledgement of involvement, for its evidence of internal 
str-uggle. But, unlike the Don Benites of the world who wither 
under the stress of reality and adopt a stance toward the world of 
false innocence, which then leads them to even greater complicity, 
Frankel comes close to seeking the advice of Calchas, and in doing 
so may well be better able to do justice in the system of injustice. 
But, in the end, Frankel's book is, like Black's, pervaded by the 
illusion of possible reform. The ultimate object is to be rid of the 
injustices, not to accept them as in some degree inevitable and then 
search for the meaning and consequences of that reality. In that 
way both books fail to pursue many of the critical questions about 
the role of injustice. Some of these questions are addressed more 
specifically by Professor Cover in his book on judicial decision-
making and the nineteenth century slave laws, Justice Accused: 
Antislavery and the Judicial Process. 
Professor Cover's book focuses on the slavery cases decided prior 
to the Civil War, particularly those involving the enforcement of the 
Fugitive Slave Act, and on the Northern antislavery judges who de-
cided them. Cover presen~s these cases as illustrative of what he 
terms the moral-formal dilemma, which exists when a judge's official 
obligation to enforce the "law" conflicts with his personal beliefs as 
to the proper moral resolution of the case. That, of course, is the 
dilemma classically associated with the character of Captain Vere in 
Melville's Billy Budd, which Cover in fact uses as an introduction 
to the problem and as an aid in his attempt to analyze Chief Justice 
Lemuel Shaw, one of the antislavery judges Cover studies and, as · 
noted earlier, Melville's father-in-law. Cover's study of fugitive ren-
dition cases leads him to several observations. He finds, first, that 
the antislavery judges almost uniformly chose to enforce the law de-
spite their personal moral predilections. Cover then seeks to deter-
mine how this affected their judicial work, employing as an analyti-
cal tool the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance.19 This 
theory states doctrinally what we know intuitively, that when forced 
to choose between two or more highly prized but inconsistent alter-
natives, attempts will be made to think and believe in ways designed 
to reduce the resulting dissonance, typically by altering the original 
perception of the stakes and thereby making the choice seem less 
difficult and more inevitable than it actually was. Armed with this 
thesis, Cover examines the opinions of four antislavery judges and 
19. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED! ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 227 
(1975), 
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identifies three types of argumentation consistent with the cognitive 
dissonance theory: a tendency to "elevate the formal stakes," by ar-
guing implausibly, for example, that the continuation of the social 
system was contingent on the enforcement of the "law"; a tendency 
to "retreat to mechanistic formalism," by pretending that the "law" 
was fixed and did not permit any result other than that reached; and 
a tendency to "ascribe responsibility elsewhere," by asserting that 
those morally accountable for the resulting injustices were not the 
judges themselves but rather the Congress, or the "people."20 
All of this, here only sketched, is highly valuable to our under-
standing of the phenomenon of judicial complicity in injustice. 
Cover provides us with comprehensive documentation of the com-
plicity that exists where the "law" imposes on the judge, as well as 
the parties, an unjust or immoral outcome. This is not, of course, 
an illustration of only historical interest; the same dilemma exists in 
many contemporary, although perhaps less dramatic, situations, such 
as the early prosecutions during the Vietnam War of nonreligious 
conscientious objectors. In this respect, therefore, Cover's book sup-
plements those of Black and Frankel. But because Cover focuses 
directly on the effects of judicial complicity, his book provides us with 
more developed ideas about the subject. Particularly important is 
his developed thesis of a link between complicity and a form of judi-
cial posturing. Like Don Benito, the antislavery judges were loath 
to acknowledge their own involvement and responsibility in the 
world's evil. 
In the end, however, Cover only hints at the most disturbing as-
pect of judicial complicity, although it lurks within the events he 
depicts. In the book's latter portions, there is a certain ambiguity 
in the discussion of judicial posturing. Cover clearly argues that 
complicity gives rise to pretense; but at times the narrative suggests 
that the posturing itself may have played a role in the initial decision-
making process.21 Judges may actually have chosen a proslavery 
result in part because it offered the greater opportunity for an image 
of noninvolvement. To have ruled in favor of the alleged slave 
would have constituted not only a breach of the judge's official duty, 
itself raising issues of moral obligation, but also a course of conduct 
for which quite clearly the judge alone would have to bear responsi-
bility. Thus, faced with the specter of a breach of obligation which-
ever way he turned, the judge naturally chose the "law," in part be-
20. Id. at 229-36. 
21. Id. at 7, 228-29, 199. 
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cause it offered the greater opportunity of disassociation from the 
result. 
Viewed from an institutional perspective, we would probably not 
find this tendency disturbing in itself. For obvious reasons we gen-
erally think it desirable that the judge implement the law even when 
he finds it personally disagreeable to do so. But the problem is in 
fact much more complex. We know that the choice typically con-
fronting the judge is not simply one of enforcing or not enforcing 
the law, but rather, within certain bounds, how to "create the law." 
Generally the judge finds the "law" somewhat open-textured, ad-
mitting of movement in tone and emphasis, if not entirely in result. 
This was, Cover says, in fact the situation with many of the cases 
arising under the Fugitive Slave Act. 22 Yet, offered an opportunity 
to ameliorate the harshness of the law and still remain faithful to 
his official responsibilities, the judges nevertheless tended to em-
brace the most rigid proslavery result. 
In some instances, apparently the judge's behavior was quite 
bizarre. For example, both Cover and Chief Justice Shaw's biog-
rapher, Leonard Levy, observe that Shaw's performance in the fugi-
tive rendition cases "differed markedly from [his] accustomed vigor 
and surefootedness."23 In deciding for the slave owner, Chief Jus-
tice Shaw behaved in extraordinarily simplistic and uncraftsmanlike 
ways; he seemed "obsessed" with "the fiction that (the Constitution) 
would never have come into being had it not provided for the return 
of runaways"24 and his use of precedent was "unjustifiable" and 
"dogmatic."26 These observations are extremely curious: it is as if 
the judge desired to avoid even the slightest realization of complicity, 
which might result from applying his imagination to the positive law 
in order to reach a more humane, less harsh result; it is as if the 
judge believed that by withdrawing his intellect from the issue and 
mechanically applying the law in its most rigid form he would be 
less answerable for what he was about to do. In this respect, we 
are faced with intriguing questions about the reactions of judges 
when confronted with evil, not just hard choices in general.26 
22. Id. at 198-99, 232-33. 
23. Id. at 251. 
24. Id. (quoting L. LEVY, THE LA.w OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE 
SHAW 99 (1957) ). 
25. Id. at 251. 
26. In a review of Professor Cover's book, Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that 
the antislavery judges may have refused to mold the law in an antislavery direction 
because of a fear that such a construction would be perceived by the populace as 
being merely the implementation of the judges' personal value choices, something 
that they felt ought to be avoided during this inflammatory period. In this respect, 
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But there is even more here to consider. As the opportunity 
for posturing may affect a judge's decision, so the resulting posturing 
may in fact reinforce his commitment to reach similar results in 
future cases. He may become, in a sense, locked into his earlier 
rhetoric and self-delusion. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is evi-
dence in the rendition cases that Shaw became increasingly dogmatic 
and rigid in his decisions; there is a sense of escalation, of increasing 
inability to see through the original smoke screen. 27 
My point here is not to suggest that these consequences for the 
decisionmaking process are the only possibilities. Nor do I mean 
to be so naive as to suggest that they in fact explain the mental proc-
esses of Chief Justice Shaw. Rather, my purpose here is limited to 
moving impressionistically toward a perspective on the judicial 
process that includes a sensitivity to the reality and role of injustice. 
As Cover notes at the outset of his book, the subject of complicity 
in injustice has been little studied; we are still feeling our way, using 
Melville as a guide. 
I have already described what I perceive in Black's and Frankel's 
books to be the leitmotiv of inevitable injustice. Both authors lift 
the veil over injustice but then replace it when they move to propos-
ing reforms. In doing so, they overlook important aspects of the ju-
dicial condition. They each see posturing with regard to their issues, 
but they do not fully appreciate its sources or explore its force and 
consequences. The problem, as Cover's book suggests, is that in the 
world of inevitable injustice this posturing may lead to ever-widening 
injustice. So the sentencing judge, a participant himself in injustice 
and a person forced by the circumstances to confront his own com-
plicity, may parade as the self-righteous innocent and inflict the 
harshest punishments. 28 And all the pretense covering the caprice 
and mistake of the criminal law may defeat Black's sensible effort 
to eradicate the death penalty. Herein, perhaps, lies the ultimate 
tragedy of the role of the judge, symbolized by the crest on the stern 
of the San Dominick: he is the victim victimizing other victims. 
Dworkin argues, a failure in jurisprudence contributed to the judges' dilemma because 
under more modem theories of jurisprudence the judges could have ameliorated the 
harsh effects of the slavery laws and still have acted, and have been perceived as 
acting, within the proper bounds of judicial discretion. Dworkin, The Law of thC! 
Slave-Catchers, THE TIMES (London) (Literary Supplement), Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437, 
27. R. COVER, supra note 19, at 249-52. 
28. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
